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Constitutional LaW-IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACT-RETROACTIVE
APPLICATION OF STATUTE IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL IMPAIRMENT OF A
ROAD CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT-State v. Edward M. Chadbourne,
Inc., 382 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1980).
The 1973 OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries) embargo on oil shipments to the United States resulted in a
dramatic increase in the price of petroleum and petroleum-based
products. The economic repercussions of the embargo were wide-
spread and acutely experienced by the road construction industry.'
In response to the potential economic harm to road contractors,
the 1974 Florida Legislature enacted a law allowing contract price
adjustments related to asphalt costs.' This law allowed the Florida
1. State v. Edward M. Chadbourne, Inc., 382 So. 2d 293, 294 (Fla. 1980).
2. Id. at 294. Ch. 74-262, § 1, 1974 Fla. Laws 708 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 337.143
(1979)), provides in part:
WHEREAS, the price of bituminous material has substantially increased during
the past months due partly to the worldwide energy crisis, and the situation now
and in the future appears to be very volatile and unstable, and
WHEREAS, a contractor has no control over the rapidly increasing prices of
bituminous material after he has successfully bid on a road construction project
with the Department of Transportation, and after entering into binding contracts
for the supply of bituminous material .....
Section 1. The State of Florida Department of Transportation shall adjust the
contract unit price for bituminous material included in any contract for roadway
construction for which bids were received by the Department of Transportation
prior to April 1, 1974, in accordance with the following.
A. The adjustment shall be calculated separately for each month during
which bituminous material is incorporated into a project using the following
formula:
Pa = Id + 5 cents where:
Pa = Adjusted unit price for bituminous material.
Id = Department's Asphalt Price Index in effect during the month
in which the material is incorporated into the project.
The Department of Transportation shall determine the Asphalt Price Index
by averaging quotations in effect on the first day of each month at termi-
nals which could reasonably be expected to furnish bituminous materials to
road construction projects in the State of Florida.
B. No adjustment shall be made for bituminous material used prior to
December 1, 1973.
C. No price adjustment reflecting any further increases in the cost of bitu-
minous material shall be made for any month after expiration of the allow-
able contract time, including any extensions that may be granted.
D. The Department shall adopt rules to implement payment of this
adjustment.
E. No adjustment shall be made to the contract unit price for bituminous
material on any applicable contract unless a contractor agrees to the appli-
cation of this adjustment for all applicable contracts he holds with the de-
partment. The department shall notify each contractor in writing by regis-
tered mail of his right to have this act apply to his contracts with the
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Department of Transportation (the department) to adjust the con-
tract unit price for bituminous materials used in roadway construc-
tion. If the contractor's bid was received by the department before
April 1, 1974, he had the option of choosing to be compensated
under the established contract price or of submitting all of his con-
tracts to the department for recalculation under a monthly price
index.3 On recalculation the department would compensate the
contractor based on the average price of bituminous materials at
terminals which supply road contractors (Asphalt Price Index)
plux five cents for each month bituminous materials were incorpo-
rated into the project.4
Soon after the implementation of the 1974 statute it became ap-
parent that some contractors were receiving windfall profits be-
cause of the statute. These contractors were requiring their suppli-
ers to provide asphalt at the pre-embargo prices, but were being
paid by the department at the higher post-embargo prices.5 In or-
der to correct this unforeseen consequence of the original law, the
department enacted an emergency rule. This rule, adopted by the
1976 legislature, had the effect of amending the 1974 law to require
that contractors document the actual price paid for asphalt in or-
der to qualify for a price adjustment based on the lesser result ob-
tained from one of three formulas: (1) actual cost plus five cents;
(2) bid price plus the difference between the asphalt index at the
time of the bid and at the time the materials were used; (3) or the
asphalt price index plus five cents.6
department. If a contractor fails to respond within 15 calendar days of such
notice, no adjustment provided for in this act shall be made to any applica-
ble contract.
Ch. 74-262, § 1A-E, 1974 Fla. Laws 708 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 337.143(2)-(8)
(1979)).
3. Ch. 74-262, § 1E, 1974 Fla. Laws 708 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 337.143(2), (8)
(1979)). See note 2 supra.
4. Ch. 74-262, § 1A, 1974 Fla. Laws 708 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 337.143(3)
(1979)). See note 2 supra.
5. State v. Edward M. Chadbourne, Inc., 382 So. 2d 293, 295 (Fla. 1980).
6. Ch. 76-174, § 1, 1976 Fla. Laws 316 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 337.143 (1979)).
FLA. STAT. § 337.143(1)-(4)(b) (1979) provides:
Adjustment of contract price for bituminous material; providing legis-
lative intent.
(1) Recognizing that the unprecedented increase in the cost of petroleum
products seriously affects a vital segment of the construction industry, legislative
intent was, and is, to protect, by this act, said industry from irreparable economic
harm and injury. It was not, and is not, legislative intent that any single contrac-
tor or groups of contractors should receive excess or windfall profits to the detri-
ment of the taxpayers, and the department shall take immediate steps to recoup
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The actions of the department and the legislature prompted liti-
gation challenging the constitutionality of section 337.143 and the
1976 amendment.' In State v. Edward M. Chadbourne, Inc.,8 the
Florida Supreme Court held that section 337.143 as originally en-
acted and amended was not a prohibited use of the state taxing
power to aid private individuals in violation of the pledging credit
clause of the Florida Constitution. The supreme court did find,
however, that the retroactive application of the 1976 amendment
was an unconstitutional impairment of contract in violation of
both the Florida and United States Constitutions."
This note will examine the Florida Supreme Court's holding in
the Chadbourne case from the perspective of federal and Florida
any excess payments made since July 1, 1974.
(2) The Department of Transportation shall adjust the contract unit price for
bituminous material included in any contract for roadway construction for which
bids were received by the department prior to April 1, 1974, in accordance with
the following:
(3)(a) The adjustment shall be calculated separately for each month during
which bituminous material is incorporated into a project, using the following
formula: Pa = Id plus 5 cents, where:
1. Pa The adjusted unit price for bituminous material; and
2. Id = The department's Asphalt Price Index in effect during the month in
which the material is incorporated into the project.
(b) The department shall determine the Asphalt Price Index by averaging
quotations in effect on the first day of each month at terminals which could rea-.
sonably be expected to furnish bituminous materials to road construction projects
in the state. However, the department shall require documentation of actual costs
paid prior to making any adjustments.
(4) the department shall not make any adjustment under subsection (3)(a)
when "Pa" exceeds:
(a) The actual unit price paid by the contractor plus 5 cents; or
(b) The bid price plus the difference in the Asphalt Price Index on December
1, 1973, and the Asphalt Price Index at the time of application. The department
shall use the lesser of subsection (4)(a) or (b) as the basis for adjustment if the
provision of subsection (3)(a) does not apply.
7. See Cone Bros. Contracting v. State, 384 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 1980) (per curiam); State v.
Craggs & Phelan Constr. Co., 384 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 1980) (per curiam); State v. W. L. Cobb
Constr. Co., 384 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 1980) (per curiam); State v. Dickerson, Inc., 382 So. 2d 298
(Fla. 1980) (per curiam); State v. Edward M. Chadbourne, Inc., 382 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 1980)
(per curiam).
8. 382 So. 2d 293, 296 (Fla. 1980). FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 10, provides in pertinent part:
"Pledging credit. Neither the state nor any county, school district, municipality, special
district, or agency of any of them, shall become a joint owner with, or stockholder of, or
give, lend or use its taxing power or credit to aid any corporation, association, partnership,
or person. ...."
9. 382 So. 2d at 293. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, provides: "No State shall . . .pass
any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts
..... " FLA. CONST. art. I, § 10, provides: "Prohibited laws. No bill of attainder, ex post
facto law or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed."
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contract clause law. In addition, alternative applications of the le-
gal concepts underlying the Florida Constitution's pledging credit
clause will be considered. Finally, issues related to the retroactive
application of remedial legislation will be explored. The author
contends that each of these concepts supports a resolution of
Chadbourne opposite to that reached by Florida's Supreme Court.
Edward M. Chadbourne, an asphalt contractor, entered into four
contracts with the department for the pavement of certain state
roads. Following the adoption of the 1974 act, Chadbourne elected
to submit all of his bids to the department for recomputation.10 In
accordance with the act, the department paid Chadbourne
$142,755.82 in addition to the bid price for two contracts, and de-
ducted $2,635.43 from the third contract's original bid price due to
a drop in the Asphalt Price Index." However, payment of the stat-
utory adjustment of $31,255.38 for the fourth contract was with-
held by the Department of Transportation.1
In 1975, Chadbourne filed suit in the Circuit Court of Escambia
County seeking $31,255, plus interest, under the 1974 statute. The
department answered and counterclaimed, pleading the 1976 stat-
ute as a defense and demanding reimbursement by Chadbourne of
the additional sums paid under the 1974 act.'8 The trial court
granted Chadbourne's motion for summary judgment and entered
judgment against the department for $34,926.25.1" The court rea-
soned that the legislature could not force contractors to accept the
terms of the original statute or its amendment, for to do so would
have been an unconstitutional impairment of contract. The legisla-
ture had merely provided the contractors with the choice of partic-
10. 382 So. 2d at 295-96.
11. Id. at 293. The following were the contracts that the supreme court considered in
Chadbourne and their 1974 adjustments:
STATE JOB 48040-8522: contract price plus $62,102.00
STATE JOB 60090-3502: contract price plus $80,653.82
STATE JOB 61560-3603: contract price less $2,635.43
Initial Brief for Appellant at 4, State v. Edward M. Chadbourne, Inc., 382 So. 2d 293 (Fla.
1980).
12. State v. Edward M. Chadbourne, Inc., 358 So. 2d 605, 606 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1978), aff'd, 382 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1980). All further payments were withheld pursuant to a
memo on conditions of moratorium placed on retroactive bituminous payments from Jay W.
Brown, Director of Road Operations, Department of Transportation to R. F. Langford,
Comptroller, Department of Transportation, Tallahassee, Fla. (April 29, 1975).
13. A trial on the merits was delayed due to a question of venue. This appeal was unsuc-
cessful and the defendant subsequently pleaded the 1976 statute as a defense. State v. Ed-
ward M. Chadbourne, Inc., 358 So. 2d 605, 606 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978), afl'd, 382 So.
2d 293 (Fla. 1980).
14. Id.
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ipating under the 1974 law, the 1976 amendment, or proceeding
under their existing contracts. Chadbourne had elected to partici-
pate under the 1974 act, and the subsequent legislation would not
affect those contracts, unless he chose to participate under the
1976 statute. 6
On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal affirmed the deci-
sion of the trial court and rejected the department's contention
that the 1974 act violated the constitutional prohibition of the
pledging credit clause which prevents the use of the state taxing
power to aid private corporations and individuals."8 The depart-
ment appealed the adverse ruling to the Florida Supreme Court
which upheld the rulings of the lower courts in a four to three per
curiam decision.' 7
The initial issue addressed by the supreme court was whether
section 337.143 was a constitutional use of state taxing powers.' 8
Essential to a determination that such legislation is constitutional
is a finding that the act serves primarily a public purpose.'" To
determine if a public purpose exists the courts will generally defer
to the legislative intent on the face of the statute, unless a showing
is made that the action is clearly beyond the power vested in the
legislature.'0 In the absence of an express public purpose the
courts have had to make this subjective determination on a case-
by-case basis." The courts attempt to follow the basic principle
that legislation will be upheld if it serves a public purpose, al-
though there may be some incidental private benefit." The deci-
sions have failed, however, to establish specific criteria for deter-
mining whether the public purpose is the overriding objective of
15. Id.
16. Id. at 607-08.
17. 382 So. 2d at 293.
18. Id. at 296.
19. Id. See Bannon v. Port of Palm Beach Dist., 246 So. 2d 737, 741 (Fla. 1971) (FLA.
CONST. art. VII, § 10 protects public funds from being used to promote private enterprises
when only an incidental benefit to the public exists); Adams v. Housing Auth., 60 So. 2d
663, 669 (Fla. 1952) (incidental benefits to the public from establishment of a private enter-
prise will not satisfy the public benefit requirement). See generally Levinson, Florida Con-
stitutional Law, 28 U. MIAMI L. REv. 551, 642-650 (1974).
20. State v. Sunrise Lakes Phase II Special Recreation Dist., 383 So. 2d 631, 633 (Fla.
1980).
21. See State v. Jacksonville Port Auth., 204 So. 2d 881, 883 (Fla. 1967). See generally
State v. City of Miami, 379 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 1980); Baycol, Inc. v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 315
So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1975); City of Naples v. Moon, 269 So. 2d 355 (Fla. 1972); Nohrr v. Brevard
County Educ. Facilities Auth., 247 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1971); State v. Jacksonville Port Auth.,
204 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 1967).
22. State v. City of Miami, 379 So. 2d 651, 653 (Fla. 1980).
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the legislation. 3
In Chadbourne the Florida Supreme Court found that section
337.143 was a valid exercise of legislative authority because the law
facilitated the construction of public roads which was manifestly a
public purpose. 4 In addition, the statute served to benefit the
state by allowing the department to pay a contractor at a rate
lower than the bid price when the Asphalt Price Index declined.
The court stated that this benefit was evidenced by Chadbourne
having received $2,600 less on one of his contracts.25
The second issue the supreme court addressed was whether the
retroactive application of the 1976 amendment would be an uncon-
stitutional impairment of a valid contract in violation of both the
Florida and United States Constitutions.26 Both the United States
Supreme Court and the Florida Supreme Court have interpreted
the contract clause as prohibiting virtually any impairment of con-
tracts, both those between private parties and those to which the
state was a party.27 The United States Supreme Court, however,
began to move from this absolute prohibition with the adoption of
23. Compare State v. City of Miami, 379 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 1980) with Baycol, Inc. v.
Downtown Dev. Auth., 315 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1975). In City of Miami the city issued revenue
bonds to finance a convention center garage which would also be used by a private univer-
sity and a private developer. The court found that the facility would provide a forum for
educational, civic, and commercial activities, and therefore serve a valid public purpose. The
incidental private benefits were not so substantial as to undermine the public character of
the garage. 379 So. 2d at 653. However, in Baycol revenue bonds were to be issued to finance
a public parking facility, and the municipality used its power of eminent domain to acquire
land and permit the private development of a shopping center. The court found that the
need for the parking facility would only arise after completion of the shopping center. The
city could not " 'create' a public necessity by taking property and applying it to a private
interest which subsequently gives rise to the asserted 'public need.'" 315 So. 2d at 458. See
also City of Naples v. Moon, 269 So. 2d 355 (Fla. 1972) (redevelopment of downtown areas
with the aid of improved parking facility serves a public purpose); Nohrr v. Brevard County
Educ. Facilities Auth., 247 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1971) (issuance of bonds by county for construc-
tion of dormitory cafeteria at a private college aided education which was a valid public
purpose); State v. Jacksonville Port Auth., 204 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 1967) (no public purpose
where port authority issued bonds for private construction of shipyard, and only public pur-
pose was increased payroll and employment).
24. 382 So. 2d at 296.
25. Id.
26. Id. For text of constitutional provisions see note 9 supra.
27. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 205-06 (1819). See Yamaha Parts
Distribs. v. Ehrman, 316 So. 2d 557, 559 (Fla. 1975) ("Virtually no degree of contract im-
pairment has been tolerated in this state."); Mahood v. Bessemer Properties, 18 So. 2d 775,
780 (Fla. 1944) (applies the old remedy-obligation test: "A state may by legislative enact-
ment modify existing remedies and substitute others without impairing the obligation of
contracts . . . ." (emphasis added)). See Note, Revival of the Contract Clause: Allied
Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus and United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 65 VA. L.
REv. 377-78 (1979).
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the remedy-obligation test. Under this rationale the state could in-
directly impair a contractual obligation by altering a remedy, pro-
vided no substantial rights of the parties were impaired. 28
The second major change in the Court's approach to the contract
clause was the reserved powers doctrine which allowed the states
to alter public and private contracts when it was necessary to pro-
tect the public health, safety, and morals." In the landmark case
of Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell the police
power doctrine was enlarged to include economic interests, but
only if the action was designed to protect the economic welfare of
the entire community for a limited time during an emergency, and
the measures taken were reasonable and appropriate to a legiti-
mate end. The Court determined the reasonableness of the legisla-
tion by balancing the state's interest against the nature of the pri-
vate rights and the extent of the contract impairment.3 1
This approach was refined by the Supreme Court in United
States Trust Co. v. New Jersey,3 2 which established a two-pronged
test to determine the validity of a state law that interferes with a
public contract. The first inquiry is whether the state is acting
under its reserved police powers which cannot be contracted
away. 8 The second prong is whether the legislation is reasonable
and necessary to serve an important public purpose. 4 Legislation
is deemed reasonable if the circumstances giving rise to the state's
action were unforeseen or unintended. 5 The law can be justified as
necessary if the action is essential to achieve a legitimate purpose
and the means used are the least restrictive available.
28. See Note, supra note 27, at 379-81. This test is no longer critical. Reasonableness has
replaced the remedy-obligation distinction as the critical focus. United States Trust Co. v.
New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.17 (1977).
29. See Note, supra note 27, at 381-87. See also Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 817-
19 (1879).
30. 290 U.S. 398, 438-39 (1934).
31. Id. See Comment, Revival of the Contract Clause, 39 OHIO ST. L. J., 195, 199 (1978).
See also City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965).
32. 431 U.S. 1 (1977). See Note, supra note 27, at 390-392.
33. 431 U.S. at 23-25: "[T]he police power and the power of eminent domain were among
those [powers] that could not be 'contracted away,' but the State could bind itself in the
future exercise of the taxing and spending powers." Id. at 23-24.
34. Id. at 25. The Court's standard of review is similar to that applied in due process and
equal protection challenges. Id. at 22-23; see Comment, supra note 31, at 198 n.30. However,
the Court stated that applications of this standard to public contracts, as opposed to private
contracts, would not permit as great a degree of deference to legislative determinations of
necessity and reasonableness since the state's own interests are at stake. 431 U.S. at 25-26.
35. Id. at 31-32.
36. Id. at 29-31.
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Florida courts, on the other hand, have been reluctant to recede
from the rigid prohibition against all forms of contract impair-
ment.37 Under Florida law, retroactive legislation will be deemed
an unconstitutional impairment of contract if it adversely affects
or destroys vested rights, or if it creates or imposes a new duty or
obligation in connection with transactions previously entered
into.'8 There is, however, a recognized exception to this prohibi-
tion-a curative or remedial statute. Remedial statutes are those
which do not create or take away vested rights, but which remedy
defects or abuses that exist in previous legislation.8"
In the 1979 decision in Pomponio v. Claridge Condominium,
Inc.,'0 the Florida Supreme Court re-examined its approach to the
contract clause and determined that some degree of impairment
would be tolerated. Noting that it was not bound by the federal
approach on this issue, the court adopted a rationale similar to
that of the Supreme Court's reasonable and necessary test, but
one, which in its view, is 'more compatible with the prohibition
against the impairment of contracts.41 Under this approach the de-
gree of permissible impairment is determined by balancing the
state's objectives and its methods of implementation against the
extent of the impact on the contracting parties' vested rights.2
The court reasoned that this approach would probably not permit
impairment to the same degree as the Supreme Court's reasonable
and necessary test.'3
37. See cases cited note 21 supra; see also Comment, The Contract Clause Reemerges: A
New Attitude Toward Judicial Scrutiny of Economic Legislation, 1978 S. ILL. L. J. 258,
260-61 (1978).
38. McCord v. Smith, 43 So. 2d 704, 708-09 (Fla. 1949). Under Florida law, legislation is
presumed to apply prospectively in the absence of a facially clear expression of retroactive
intent. Yamaha Parts Distribs. v. Ehrman, 316 So. 2d 557, 559 (Fla. 1975). See generally
Levinson, supra note 19, at 601-02.
39. See Metropolitan Dade County v. Leslie Enterprises, Inc., 257 So. 2d 29, 30 (Fla.
1972).
40. 378 So. 2d 774, 779-80 (Fla. 1979).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 780. The supreme court formulated a test to determine the degree of contract
impairment that would be tolerated:
[W]e must weigh the degree to which a party's contract rights are statutorily im-
paired against both the source of the authority under which the state purports to
alter the contractual relationship and the evil it seeks to remedy .... [T)his be-
comes a balancing process to determine whether the nature and extent of the im-
pairment is constitutionally tolerable in light of the importance of the state's ob-
jective, or whether it unreasonably intrudes into the parties' bargain to a degree
greater than is necessary to achieve that objective.
Id.
43. Id.
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Failing to employ the newly established balancing test, the
supreme court in Chadbourne held that the retroactive application
of the 1976 amendment, which clearly affected existing contract
rights, was an unconstitutional impairment of contract.44 Noting
the express legislative intent to avoid the unforeseen consequence
of windfall profits, the court nevertheless held that a "noble and
just" motive will not validate constitutionally prohibited
legislation."5
Merely citing the recent review of contract clause issues in
Pomponio and State v. Cone Brothers Contracting Co.4e as settled
law, the court declined to analyze the facts of Chadbourne to any
greater degree.' It failed to apply either the balancing test from
Pomponio or the recognized remedial exception to retroactive leg-
islation, and adopted, instead, the dissenting opinion in Cone
Brothers.'5 The effect of the Chadbourne decision is to shroud
Florida contract clause law in a fog of confusion. Since the Cone
Brothers dissent was written before Pomponio and without benefit
of its newly adopted balancing test, the holding in Chadbourne ap-
pears to have reversed the more liberal approach to contract im-
pairment established in Pomponio. Even though the court does not
expressly reject the approach in Pomponio, the fact that Pomponio
is ignored in favor of a rationale based on the more rigid prohibi-
tion against contract impairment seriously undermines the force of
that decision.
The more obvious effect of Chadbourne is to provide excess
profits to contractors who have performed no additional work.4 9 It
is difficult to perceive how the public is benefiting by the payment
44. 382 So. 2d at 297.
45. Id. at 296-97.
46. 364 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
47. 382 So. 2d at 297.
48. Id. See Metropolitan Dade County v. Leslie Enterprises, Inc., 257 So. 2d 29 (Fla.
1972):
Remedial statutes are exceptions to the rule that statutes are addressed to the
future, not the past. One of the purposes of such a statute is to give effect to acts
and contracts of individuals according to the intention thereof. . . . Remedial
statutes do not come within the legal conception of a retrospective law, or the
general rule against the retrospective operation of statutes.
Id. at 30. (quoting Grammer v. Roman, 174 So. 2d 443, 446 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1965)
(citations omitted)). See also State v. Cone Bros. Contracting Co., 364 So. 2d 482, 486 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978): "A curative or remedial statute is necessarily retrospective in char-
acter and may be enacted to cure or validate errors or irregularities in legal or administra-
tive proceedings, except such as are jurisdictional or affect vested substantive rights." (em-
phasis added).
49. 382 So. 2d at 297-98 (Overton, J., dissenting).
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of 3.8 million tax dollars above contract prices to road contractors
unharmed by the embargo.50 The 1976 amendment's requirement
of documentation as a restriction upon the price adjustment does
not substantially impair a contractor's legitimate rights under a
statutory option that was never bargained for in the first place.
The supreme court in Chadbourne had several available alterna-
tives which would have supported a decision more equitable to the
citizens of the state. The first of these alternatives was argued by
Justice Overton, in a well-reasoned dissent. He contended that the
pledging credit clause of the Florida Constitution should have con-
trolled the outcome of this case."' Originally, the 1974 statute was
passed to prevent the potential bankruptcy of contractors due to
increased oil prices, and thereby to ensure the continued construc-
tion of public roads. But the 1974 legislation had an unintended
result. Contractors, unharmed by the oil embargo and capable of
continuing their contracts, are receiving additional payments that
amount to windfall profits. In this situation the paramount public
purpose required by the pledging credit clause does not exist since
the continued construction of roads is not in jeopardy.8
Justice Overton identified the "catch-22" aspect of this issue by
explaining that unless the 1976 amendment requiring documented
losses is applied retroactively, the 1974 statute alone is unconstitu-
tional for failure to serve a public purpose. Without documented
losses to the contractor, road construction is not jeopardized and
the public purpose of the law becomes incidental to the private
contractor's gain."
The majority justified its finding of a public purpose by charac-
terizing the 1974 statute as one that could benefit the state or the
contractor. The state benefit occurs when contract prices are re-
duced because of a decline in the Asphalt Price Index.0 ' Although
theoretically valid, this reasoning flies in the face of economic real-
ities. It was an extremely remote possibility that the oil prices
would drop during the period in question thereby enabling the
state to derive any significant benefit from reduced contract
50. Telephone interview with H. Reynolds Sampson, General Counsel, Florida Depart-
ment of Transportation, in Tallahassee, Fla. (June 25, 1980).
51. 382 So. 2d at 297.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 297-98.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 296.
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prices." Although Chadbourne did receive $2,635 less on one of his
contracts, he received almost $143,000 more on two other con-
tracts, plus an additional $35,000 on the contract in the instant
case. 57 It can be assumed that few contractors would have accepted
the index formula if they believed their compensation would be
less than their original contract price. Furthermore, if the legisla-
ture had contemplated a price decrease, it is unlikely that section
337.143 would have been enacted."
In addition to this more logical analysis of the state taxing power
issue, the court could have upheld the 1976 amendment as a valid
impairment of contract by applying the Supreme Court's reasona-
ble and necessary test as developed in United States Trust Co.
Under this approach the state cannot validly contract away either
its police powers or powers of eminent domain, since these are es-
sential attributes of sovereignty. If the state has violated this pro-
hibition, the Supreme Court has determined that the contract
clause does not require the state to adhere to its contract.59
If the state has not violated this prohibition, the next inquiry
focuses on the state's objectives and the available means to reach
them. If the legislation is reasonable and necessary to serve an im-
portant public purpose it will be valid even if it incidentally results
in the impairment of contract.2 The reasonableness of the legisla-
tion will depend on the foreseeability of the circumstances which
the law seeks to address. If the events giving rise to the legislation
56. State v. Edward M. Chadbourne, Inc., 358 So. 2d 605, 608 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1978) (Ervin, J., dissenting), aff'd, 382 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1980). Asphalt Price Index from
December, 1973 through July, 1975:
Month Index Month Index
December, 1973 0.1591 January, 1975 0.2928
January, 1974 0.1958 February, 1975 0.2929
February, 1974 0.2192 March, 1975 0.2933
March, 1974 0.2590 April, 1975 0.2988
April, 1974 0.2650 May, 1975 0.2969
May, 1974 0.2776 June, 1975 0.2980
June, 1974 0.2787 July, 1975 0.3029
July, 1974 0.2875
August, 1974 0.2875
September, 1974 0.2889
364 So. 2d at 484.
57. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
58. 364 So. 2d at 488.
59. United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 23-25. Purely financial obligations, as those in
Chadbourne, are not generally considered to fall within the reserved powers prohibition. Id.
at 24.
60. Id. at 25.
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were unforeseen and unintended then the action is presumed to be
reasonable. 1 The majority in Chadbourne did, in fact, imply that
the 1976 legislation was reasonable when it admitted that the
windfall profits were an unintended result of the 1974 statute.2
In order to satisfy the necessity requirement the least intrusive
means must be utilized by the state to reach its objective." This
factor was not addressed in Chadbourne, but if it had been, the
court could have easily declared that the amendment was the least
intrusive means to prevent overpayments. Under the 1976 amend-
ment contractors actually harmed would still receive payments to
alleviate the unexpected increase in the price of oil. By requiring
documentation, the department could discern whether there was a
genuine need for the additional payments to a contractor. When
considered against the state's burden in having to pay the adjust-
ment from the public funds the provisions of the 1976 legislation
pale by comparison. Therefore, the federal test provides a fair
standard upon which to balance the rights of the public and the
contracting parties.
Finally, the Chadbourne court failed even to apply its own bal-
ancing approach to the contract clause which was established in
Pomponio. Pomponio involved the retroactive application of a
statute that required the deposit of rents into the registry of the
court during litigation involving a condominium lease. The chal-
lenged statute allowed disbursement to the lessor of amounts nec-
essary for the maintenance of the premise during litigation." The
law was declared an unconstitutional impairment of contract be-
cause the means adopted were not the least intrusive. The dis-
bursement criteria ignored the validity of economic needs other
than preservation of the property. Failure to provide some proce-
dure for a showing of needs beyond maintenance expenses created
an unnecessary economic deprivation. 5 The court reached this
conclusion by balancing the nature and extent of the contractual
impairment against the state's objectives. 6 The remediation of un-
foreseeable and unintended results of legislation was not an ex-
press factor in the court's analysis as it was in United States Trust
61. Id. at 31.
62. 382 So. 2d at 296-97.
63. 431 U.S. at 29-31.
64. 378 So. 2d at 780-81.
65. Id. at 780-82.
66. Id. at 780. There was no clear documentation as to what the legislature's objectives
were. Id. at 781.
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Application of this balancing test to the Chadbourne case would
place the 1976 amendment within the permissible scope of the con-
tract clause. The state's intention was to compensate financially
burdened contractors and to eliminate the windfall profits that
were being paid from state funds. Any impairment that occurred
was primarily to those contractors who would not receive the "bo-
nuses" from the loophole in the original act if the amendment was
applied retroactively.
Instead of utilizing the balancing test, the Chadbourne majority
elected to follow the views expressed by Judge Grimes in his dis-
sent in Cone Brothers. 67 In Cone Brothers, the Second District
Court of Appeal held that the 1976 amendment was a valid reme-
dial statute and could be applied retroactively. 8 The district court
found the amendment to be reasonable and necessary to prevent
unintended excess profits." Judge Grimes, however, argued that
the law would impair existing contracts if applied retroactively.
When the contractors exercised their option under the 1974 law,
the price formula became part of the contract. The 1976 amend-
ment, asserted Judge Grimes, attempted to alter this formula
unconstitutionally.70
An oversight common to both the Chadbourne court and Judge
Grimes in Cone Brothers, was the remedial aspect of the amend-
ment. The legislature intended to remedy a defect in the original
statute-the unintended windfall profits which render the 1974 law
unconstitutional for lack of a public purpose. 71 The amendment
does not alter the basic price index but merely requires contractors
to document their actual costs. The law does restrict the additional
compensation, but only to the extent that contractors would other-
wise receive excess profits at public expense. The contracts still
contain the basic index price, plus five cents, which covers any in-
creased costs for bituminous material. Certainly, if the supreme
court had liberally construed the desired effect of the legislation,
the 1976 amendment would have been declared a valid remedial
statute.7 2 The legislation was designed to alter a defect and does
67. 364 So. 2d at 490 (Grimes, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 486.
69. Id. at 487.
70. Id. at 491.
71. See note 56 and accompanying text supra.
72. See State v. Stedman, 223 So. 2d 85, 86 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (remedial
statutes should be liberally construed so as to give them the beneficial effect desired).
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not modify or alter substantial contractual rights.
The impact of the Chadbourne ruling will be most evident to
contractors who will receive almost four million dollars as a result
of the decision.73 Although the supreme court declared that the
primary purpose of the act was to benefit the public, it seems ap-
parent that this was incidental in comparison to the substantial
financial gain to the contractor.
The 1974 law was construed as making a "fair adjustment" to
the contract price for both parties. 4 However, the fallacy of this
statement can be shown by the difference in the payments under
each formula. In the instant case, Chadbourne received $80,653.82
over the original bid price on one contract. Under the 1976
formula, based on the actual price paid, plus five cents, his pay-
ment would have been $13,141.71. 75 It is evident from the approxi-
mate difference of $67,500 in the two formulas that the public is
not the primary beneficiary of the 1974 law.
One court has characterized the 1974 legislation as a "contrac-
tor's relief act," similar to other social welfare programs .7 The leg-
islation was, in effect, granting public funds to contractors in order
to alleviate the perceived irreparable economic harm which might
occur from the embargo. Although the continued construction of
roads is vital to Florida's economy, this does not justify a law that
provides excess profits in return for no additional work. This is
especially true when remedial legislation was available to cure the
defect in the original statute and to provide a more equitable
solution.
The supreme court's holding will not only have an adverse im-
pact on the economy of the state, but also on the vitality of deci-
sions made before Chadbourne under the contract clause. In
Pomponio the supreme court devoted a significant portion of its
opinion to establishing the criteria for the balancing test and spe-
cifically applying it to the facts of the case. Less than six months
73. Interview with Vernon Dixon, Assistant Final Estimates Engineer, Florida Depart-
ment of Transportation, in Tallahassee, Fla. (June 30, 1980).
74. 382 So. 2d at 296.
75. Interview with Vernon Dixon, Assistant Final Estimates Engineer, Florida Depart-
ment of Transportation, in Tallahassee, Fla. (June 30, 1980). Another example of the differ-
ence in the final adjustments under each formula was STATE JOB 46050-3105 in which
Chadbourne was a subcontractor. Under the 1974 law his payment was $154,723.16 over his
bid price. The 1976 formula of actual cost plus five cents would have given Chadbourne
$8,411.76 in addition to his contract price. This amounts to $146,311.40 in windfall profits
under the 1974 law.
76. Cone Brothers, 364 So. 2d at 487.
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later, however, the court in Chadbourne merely alluded to the test
in reaching its decision and failed to provide any further guidelines
on when or to what degree contractual impairment will be permit-
ted. A sense of judicial fair play would seem to dictate the neces-
sity of fleshing out the skeleton of a newly adopted approach to a
constitutional question through application to the facts of subse-
quent cases. Furthermore, the court's failure to carefully analyze
Chadbourne under the Pomponio balancing test may indicate a
lack of judicial committment to that approach in the future.
This possibility is supported to some extent by a comparison of
the justices' positions in the Pomponio and Chadbourne decisions.
Both decisions seem to indicate that the court is in agreement that
some degree of contract impairment will be tolerated, however,
consensus has apparently not yet been reached on the approach to
be used in determining the scope of permissible impairment. In
Pomponio the newly enunciated balancing test was approved by
Chief Justice England and Justices Boyd, Overton, and Sund-
berg." Justice Overton, however, concurred specially, implying
that he would have allowed the contract impairment at issue on
more lenient grounds than those expressed by the majority.78 Jus-
tice Adkins concurred in the result only, which gives little indica-
tion of his stand on the newly adopted test,7 9 and Justice Alder-
man dissented without filing an opinion.80
The four to three decision in Chadbourne found Justices Over-
ton, Adkins, and Alderman dissenting.8 Justice Overton, writing
for the dissent, argued that the contract impairment in Chad-
bourne falls squarely within that permitted under the more liberal
federal reasonable and necessary test set forth in United States
Trust Co. 82 Impliedly, he no longer agrees with the majority in
Pomponio which asserted that a stricter analysis was more com-
patible with the constitutional prohibition.8
The result of this apparent internal struggle is that the state, the
legislature, and any contracting parties are left only with a vague
idea of the degree of impairment that will be tolerated by the su-
preme court. The continued validity of the balancing test will only
77. 378 So. 2d at 774.
78. Id. at 782-83.
79. Id. at 782.
80. Id.
81. 382 So. 2d at 297.
82. Id.
83. 378 So. 2d at 780.
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be ensured when the court resolves any internal conflicts, sets forth
the new approach in clear and unambigous terms, and specifically
applies it to the facts of particular cases. Perhaps then the end
result will benefit the public.
ROBERTA J. KARP
